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UPPING THE ANTE: THE UNLAWFUL
INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT
ACT'S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW
HeatherA. Bloom*
I. INTRODUCTION
Armed with a public morals rationale, the United States has
taken significant steps in the past decade to prohibit offshore internet
gambling. In 2003, the small country of Antigua and Barbuda
("Antigua") brought a claim at the World Trade Organization (WTO)
against the United States.' Antigua argued that the U.S. prohibition of
offshore internet gambling violated commitments the U.S. had made
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 2 The
Panel agreed with Antigua that U.S. federal laws governing internet
gambling are inconsistent with U.S. commitments and are not justified
by public morals. 3 The WTO panel's decision was a victory for

J.D., 2008, The George Washington University Law School; B.A.,
Georgetown University. I thank Professor Steve Chamovitz and Professor
Gregory Maggs of G.W. Law School for their help on earlier drafts.
I Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-border
1.1-1.2, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10,
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
2004) ("Panel Report"). WTO disputes arise "when one country adopts a trade
policy measure or takes some action that one or more fellow-WTO members
considers to be breaking the WTO agreements," or failing to abide by its
obligations and commitments. Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes,
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/displ e.htm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2008). A dispute may go through several stages at the WTO,
including: (1) consultation, (2) the panel (panel appointment and the panel's
final report), (3) appeals, and (4) enforcement (e.g. arbitration, compliance
review, and sanctions). Panels are comparable to tribunals, except that expert
"panelists are usually chosen in consultation with the countries in dispute."
The Dispute Settlement Body, which consists of all WTO member countries,
reserves the right "to accept or reject" a panel's findings or the Appellate
Body's holdings. Id.
2
See Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the
1-2,
Cross-border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report].
3 Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.608.
*
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Antigua,
the smallest nation ever to bring a WTO complaint against the
4
U.S.

The WTO Appellate Body, however, significantly reversed the
Panel's findings, holding that the U.S. could justify the prohibition
under public policy, except with regard to horseracing. 5 Despite the
6
WTO's decision that the U.S. modify its interstate horseracing laws,
the U.S. failed to comply with the recommendation in 2006. 7 Instead,
President George W. Bush signed the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA), which prohibits remote internet
gambling, except on horseracing, by requiring (1) financial institutions
to identify and block illegal internet gambling transactions; and (2)
gambling businesses to stop payments through credit card, "electronic
fund transfer," or check. 8
The recently enacted UIGEA violates WTO law, in particular as
analyzed against the backdrop of the WTO Appellate Body's decision
in United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services (the Antigua case). To comply with
WTO law, the U.S. should (1) clarify that the UIGEA applies to
horseracing; (2) amend the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 so that it
prohibits remote internet gambling; and (3) adjust the UIGEA to fit
within GATS article XIV's "public morals" exception.
Part I of this article introduces the Wire Act, the main statute
used to criminalize illegal internet gambling and provides an overview
of significant internet gambling cases decided prior to the Appellate
Body Report. This section also serves as a starting point for explaining
why Antigua brought a WTO claim against the U.S. Part II analyzes
current WTO law, specifically GATS articles XIV and XVI, the
4

Paul Blustein, Against All Odds: Antigua Besting U.S. in Internet
Gambling Case at WTO, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2006, at D1.
5 Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, at 123-26; see Joost Pauwelyn,
WTO Softens Earlier Condemnation of U.S. Ban on Internet Gambling, but
Confirms Broad Reach into Sensitive Domestic Regulation, AM. SOCY INT'L L.
INSIGHT, Apr. 2005, http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/04/insights0504l2.html.
6 See Appellate Body Report, supra note 2,
371-72. In addition, the
WTO Arbitrator recommended that the U.S. modify its existing internet
gambling laws on horseracing. See Award of the Arbitrator, United StatesMeasures Affecting the Cross-borderSupply of Gambling and Betting Services,
37, 64, WT/DS285/13 (Aug. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Arbitration Report).
7 See Compliance Report, United States-Measures Affecting the
Cross-borderSupply of Gambling and Betting Services, 7.1, WT/DS285/RW
(Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Compliance Report].
8 31 U.S.C. §§ 5363-64 (2006).
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relevant provisions a WTO panel would use to examine the UIGEA.
Furthermore, the section discusses the Appellate Body's application of
GATS in the Antigua case and examines how the U.S. violated its
commitments under GATS.
Part III analyzes the UIGEA's language and focuses on the
legislative intent behind the statute. In addition, this section considers
(1) whether Congress ignored WTO law when drafting the bill; (2) the
new law's relation to previous internet gambling bills; and (3) the
immediate effects of enacting the UIGEA. Part IV examines how a
WTO panel would rule on the UIGEA. Part V argues that the UIGEA
does not comply with GATS, focuses on what steps the U.S. should
take to bring the UIGEA in compliance with GATS, and why the U.S.
should comply with WTO law in this case.
II. THE WIRE ACT AND U.S. CASES DECIDED PRIOR TO THE
APPELLATE BODY DECISION
A. USING THE WIRE ACT TO PROSECUTEILLEGAL GAMBLING
In 1961, Congress enacted the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, in
response to the use of race betting over wires of communication, such
as telephones and telegraphs. 9 The Wire Act prohibits a person from
engaging "in the business of betting or wagering" and "knowingly
us[ing] a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate
or foreign commerce of bets or wagers."' By denying gamblers access
to "information and communications infrastructure," the Wire Act's
framers hoped to eliminate organized gambling." Beginning in 1998,
the Department of Justice (DOJ) began using the Wire Act to prosecute
offshore internet gambling operators, claiming that the internet was a
"wire communication facility.' 12 In response, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits determined that internet
gambling on sporting events and contests falls within the scope of the

9

DAVID

G.

SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMING PROHIBITION AND

THE INTERNET 7 (2005).

'o 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2006).
1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 9.
12 Ted Magder, Gambling, the WTO, and Public Morals, 7 TELEVISION

& NEW MEDIA 52, 56 (2006).
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Wire Act, and that cross-border internet gambling
must be legal in both
3
the jurisdiction of the operator and the bettor.'
In the most prominent internet gambling case, United States v.
Cohen, the DOJ prosecuted Mr. Cohen under the Wire Act in 2001 for
running a remote internet gambling site in Antigua.14 The Second
Circuit stated that the Wire Act prohibited remote internet gambling
even where the bet's destination, such as Antigua, is legal. 15 Mr.
Cohen later discovered that the U.S. government's position on remote
internet gambling was potentially vulnerable to a trade complaint and
notified Antigua. 16 Specifically, Mr. Cohen urged Antigua to bring a
complaint at the WTO and to argue that a U.S. prohibition on offshore
internet gambling violated its commitments under GATS.17
B. THE U S. AND ANTIGUA 'S POSITIONS ON THE WIRE A CT
Throughout the past few years, U.S. courts and the DOJ have
drawn conflicting interpretations of the Wire Act. 18 In 2002, the Fifth
Circuit first limited the scope of the Wire Act's application in In re
MasterCardInternational,Inc.19 The plaintiffs in this case were two
credit card holders who alleged that credit card companies and issuing
banks had aided a "worldwide gambling enterprise." 20 In interpreting
'3 See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (2006); United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68,
73-74 (2d Cir. 2001).
14 Cohen, 260 F.3d at 70. Mr. Cohen's enterprise was called the World
Sports Exchange.
"s Id. at 73.
1 See Blustein, supra note 4.
17 Id.; see also Statement of the United States at the Oral Hearing of the
Appellate Body, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-BorderSupply
of Gambling and Betting Services, 36, WT/DS285/AB-2005-1 (Feb. 21,
2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Monitoring
_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispute SettlementListings/asset up
loadfile142_5581.pdf (noting that this dispute was "inspired by the felony
conviction [of Mr. Cohen] under the Wire Act").
18 Compare In re MasterCard Int'l, Inc., 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002),
and Appellant Submission of the United States, United States-Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 198,
WT/DS285/AB-2005-1 (Jan. 14, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov
/assets/TradeAgreements/MonitoringEnforcement/DisputeSettlementWTO
/DisputeSettlementListings/asset upload file50_5581.pdf [hereinafter U.S.
Appellant Submission).
19 In re MasterCard, 313 F.3d at 262, aft'g 132 F. Supp. 2d 468
(E.D.La. 2001).
20 Id.at 260.
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the Wire Act, the court affirmed the lower court's conclusion that the
21
Act only applies to gambling involving a "sporting event or contest.",
In contrast, the DOJ argued to the WTO panel, Appellate Body, and
Arbitrator in Antigua that the Wire Act encompasses all forms of
internet gambling. 22 In its briefs and submissions to the WTO, the DOJ
confirmed that "existing criminal statutes," in particular the Wire Act,
prohibit all internet gambling, "including wagers on horse races. 23
The DOJ's position is problematic for two reasons. First, its
interpretation conflicts with the Second Circuit in In re MasterCardby
failing to limit the scope of the Wire Act to contests and sporting
events.24 Yet, the DOJ asserted that it was not bound by the In re
MasterCarddecision "because it was not a party to the case." 25 The
DOJ's reasoning, however, undermines the federal court system's
legitimacy.
Second, the DOJ's position suggests that the Wire Act
supersedes the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA). The IHA, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3001-3007, regulates gambling on horseracing. In 2000, Congress
amended the IHA to expand "interstate off-track wager[s]" to include
"pari-mutuel wagers... placed or transmitted by an individual in one
State via telephone or other electronic media and accepted ... in the

21 Id. at 262-63.
22 See infra note 23; I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: An
Introduction to the Law of Internet Gambling, 10 U. NEV. LAS VEGAS
GAMBLING RES. & REV. J. 1, 5 (2005) [hereinafter Rose, Gambling and the
Law].
23 Status Report by the United States: Addendum, United StatesMeasures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services,
WT/DS285/15/Add.1
(Apr.
11,
2006),
available
at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/GENsearchResult.asp;
see First Written
Submission of the United States, United States-Measures Affecting the Crossborder Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
33-35, WT/DS285 (Oct.
16, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements
/MonitoringEnforcement/DisputeSettlement/WTO/DisputeSettlementListi
ngs/asset upload file732_5581 .pdf U.S. Appellant Submission, supra note 18,
198.
24 In re MasterCard, 313 F.3d at 262-63; see also Jason Gross, Internet
Gambling & the Law-Prohibition vs. Regulation, METROPOLITAN CORP.
CouNs., Aug. 2006, at 11 (noting that despite the decision in In re MasterCard,
the DOJ continues "to proclaim that Federal law prohibits [all] gambling over
the Internet.").
25 See Rose, Gambling and the Law, supra note 22.
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same or another State." 26 Under rules of statutory construction,
specific statutes take precedent over "statute[s] of broad, general
application." 27 Thus, the recent IHA amendment takes precedent over
the more general provisions of the Wire Act of 1961.28
Antigua, on the other hand, interpreted the Wire Act very
differently than the DOJ. In its complaint to the WTO, Antigua
challenged U.S. federal and state laws, including the Wire Act, 29 and
claimed that they prohibited "cross-border delivery of gambling
services." 30 The WTO Appellate Body found in its report that the U.S.
primarily used the Wire Act to ban remote internet gambling.3 1
Furthermore, the Appellate Body disagreed and held that (1) the U.S.
did not prove that the Wire Act governs online interstate horseracing,
and (2) the IHA's provision allowing remote internet gambling on
horseracing is discriminatory.32 The DOJ, nevertheless, continues to
argue that there is no need to modify its current interstate horseracing

26 Interstate Horeracing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007 (2006). "Parimutuel wagering" is a term used specifically in the horseracing context to refer
to off track wagering over the internet. Specifically, the participants wager
with each other rather than "against the operator" of the pool. 15 U.S.C. §
3002(13).
27 Robert Penchina, What Does DOJ Have against the Interstate
HorseracingAct, 10 GAMING L. REv. 446, 450 (2006).
28 Id. at 450-51 (citing Rodgers v. United States, 185 U.S. 83, 89
(1902)); see California v. United States, 215 F.3d 1005, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000));
Anthony N. Cabot & Eugene Christiansen, Why the Future of HorseracingIs at
Risk The WTO Decision and Senator Kyl, 9 GAMING L. REv. 201, 205 (2005).
29 See James Thayer, The Trade of Cross-borderInternet Gambling:
The Dispute Continues, 10 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2006). In addition, Antigua
challenged two other federal laws: the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006),
and the Illegal Gambling Business Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2006). Although the
government has not used the Travel Act and Illegal Gambling Business Act to
prosecute illegal internet gambling, it has used these federal criminal statutes
"to prosecute organizations that facilitate gambling over the telephone."
30 Joel P. Trachtman, United States-Measures Affecting the Crossborder Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 99 Am. J. INT'L L. 861, 862
(2005).
31 Appellate Body Report, supra note 2,
265. This prohibition,
however, was justified under the public morals exception. See infra part II.B.
The Wire Act also contains a safe-harbor provision allowing states to
potentially discriminate against foreign countries with respect to remote
internet gambling. Thayer, supra note 29, at 14. Although I will not address
the issue of state law in this article, the safe-harbor provision might present
WTO compliance problems in the future.
32 Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 369.
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the Wire Act encompasses this type of internet
statute because
33
gambling.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF WTO LAW: GATS AND THE 2005
APPELLATE BODY REPORT
To determine whether the Wire Act and other U.S. federal
statutes violated WTO law, the WTO Panel and Appellate Body
applied the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
A. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES
GATS, which came into effect in 1995, is a set of multilateral
rules negotiated during the Uruguay Round.34 GATS covers a range of
international trade services, including banking, telecommunications,
and as in the present case, gambling and betting services. 35 GATS can
be divided into three main segments: (1) the main text listing member
countries' general obligations, disciplines, and rules; (2) "annexes
dealing with rules for specific [service] sectors"; and (3) "individual
countries' specific commitments to provide access to their markets. 36

33 See Penchina, supra note 27, at 449, 451-52 (noting that the DOJ's
"position is rooted in its belief in a policy, not on a faithful application of the
law as written").
34 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. The Uruguay Round was a series of
multilateral trade negotiations that began in Punta del Este, Uruguay and
The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE
concluded in Geneva in 1993.
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis e/tif e/fact5 e.h
tm (last visited Jun. 10, 2007). The negotiations reformed international trading
systems by extending to new areas, such as trade in services. Id. Ministers of
countries throughout the world developed GATS at the Uruguay Round to deal
with substantial growth in the area of trade services. Services: Rules for
Growth and Investment, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.
wto.org/English/the wtoe/whatis e/tif e/agrm6_e.htm (last visited Jun. 10,
2007).
35 See Services: Rules for Growth and Investment, supra note 34.
36 id.
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1. GATS ARTICLE XVI: MARKET ACCESS COMMITMENTS

GATS article XVI addresses commitments on market access,
which are applicable to gambling and betting services. The WTO
describes market access commitments as requiring individual countries
to commit "open markets in specific sectors," such as gambling and
betting services. 3 7 "The commitments appear in 'schedules' that list the
sectors being opened, the extent of market access being
38 given in those
sectors ... and any limitations on national treatment."

access restrictions are prohibited for
Under article XVI, market
39

"committed service sectors.,

Thus, a market access violation occurs
where "government intervention in the services industry .
quantitatively restricts the very access or establishment of
foreign
4
services or service suppliers to a country's domestic market. AO
Furthermore, article XVI:2(a) and (c) state:
2.
In
sectors
where
market-access commitments are
undertaken, the measures which a
Member shall not maintain or adopt
either on the basis of a regional
subdivision or on the basis of its
entire territory, unless otherwise
specified in its Schedule, are
defined as:
(a)
limitations on the
number
of
service
suppliers
whether in the form of numerical
quotas,
monopolies,
exclusive
service
suppliers
or
the
requirements of an economic needs
test;

37 Id.
38 id.

39 Joost Pauwelyn, Rien ne Va Plus? Distinguishing Domestic
Regulation from Market Access in GATT and GATS, 4 WORLD TRADE REV.
131, 136 (2005).
40
Id.
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(c) limitations on the total
number of service operations or on
the total quantity of service output
expressed in terms of designated
numerical units in the form of
of an
quotas or the requirement
4
economic needs test. '
Analyzing article XVI, a WTO panel would address whether a
"qualitative measure" prohibiting remote internet gambling services
can be "understood as a quantitative restriction" or limitation within the
meaning of 2(a) and (c). 42 For example, in the Antigua case, the
UIGEA's prohibition on remote internet gambling in effect bans the
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services by limiting to
zero the number of these suppliers, thereby violating provisions (a) and
(c) of article XVI(2).43 Thus, the Appellate Body in the Antigua case
found that the U.S. limitation on the number of foreign suppliers was a
market access violation. 44
2. GATS ARTICLE XIV: THE PUBLIC MORALS EXCEPTION
Even if a WTO panel finds a market access violation, the
measure might nevertheless be permissible under the Public Morals

Exception of article XIV. WTO members are permitted to adopt
measures which are "necessary to protect public morals or maintain
public order.",45 The test is (1) whether a restriction fits within the
public morals exception and (2) whether the restriction is necessary for
the protection of these morals. 6 The public morals exception,
however, cannot be applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner
"between countries where like conditions prevail, or [as] a disguised
restriction on trade in services. '47 The U.S. would likely try to justify
the UIGEA under the public morals exception because the Appellate

41

GATS art. XVI:2(a), (c).

Trachtman, supra note 30, at 861.
Id. at 863.
44 See Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 265.
4' GATS art. XIV(a).
46 Tomer Broude, Taking "Trade and Culture" Seriously:
GeographicalIndications and Cultural Protection in WTO Law, 26 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 623, 683 (2005).
47 GATS art. XIV; see Thayer, supra note 29, at 15.
42

41
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Body in the Antigua case held that the public morals exception applied
with respect to the Wire Act.48
B. THE 2005 APPELLATE BODY REPORT
A WTO panel would use the Appellate Body Report as the
framework for examining the UIGEA because both present the same
legal issues. The Appellate Body in the Antigua case found that the
U.S. had primarily used the Wire Act to ban remote internet
gambling. 49 Although the U.S. prohibition on remote internet gambling
under the Wire Act was a restriction on "trade in services" under
GATS, 50 the Appellate Body held that the ban was permissible under
the public morals exception. The Appellate Body Report can be
analyzed in four main sections: (1) Commitments, (2) Prohibited
Market Access Restrictions,
(3) Public Morals Exception, and (4) the
5
Horseracing Exception. '
1. U.S. COMMITMENTS
The U.S. made specific commitments to the WTO "to provide
market access and nondiscriminatory treatment" regarding the crossborder supply of gambling and betting services. 52 Although the U.S.
did not explicitly list "gambling and betting services" as a committed
sector, the Appellate Body found a basis for this commitment under the
U.S. general commitments regarding "other recreational services

See infra Part III.B.3.
41 See infra Part III.B.3.
50 Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, at 60-66; see Pauwelyn, supra
48

note 5.
51 Note that the "Horseracing Exception" section falls within the
context of the previous section on public morals. The Appellate Body similarly
structured its report in this format. Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, at ii
(table of contents); see Markus Krajewski, Playing by the Rules of the Game?
Specific Commitments After US-Gambling and Betting and the Current GA TS
Negotiations, 32 LEGAL ISSUES OF EcON. INTEGRATION 417, 419 (2005);

Pauwelyn, supra note 5.
52 Craig Pouncey & Lode Van Den Hende, Bush's Gambling Ban
Flouts WTO Commitments, THE LAWYER, Oct. 30, 2006, http://www.the
lawyer.com /cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=122694&d=122&h=24&f=46; see Appellate
Body Report, supra note 2, 213.

2008]

UPPING THE ANTE: THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET
GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT'S NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW

85

(except sporting). 53 The Appellate Body found that sporting services
do not encompass gambling. 54 Moreover, the Appellate Body, like the
Panel, dismissed the "U.S. argument that it never intended to make a
commitment in gambling and betting," noting that "it is not for the
Panel [or Appellate Body] to second-guess the intentions of the United
States at the time the commitment was scheduled. 5 5 Instead, the
WTO's role is to interpret
and "apply the GATS in light of the facts
56
and evidence before us."
2. PROHIBITED MARKET ACCESS RESTRICTION
Upon finding that the U.S. had made a commitment to supply
gambling and betting services in a non-discriminatory manner, the
Appellate Body addressed whether the U.S. had satisfied this
commitment.
The Appellate Body held that the U.S. domestic
regulation prohibiting remote intemet gambling services, whether
domestic or foreign, is a prohibited market access restriction under
GATS.57 In other words, this "U.S. measure regulating how gambling
services are to be supplied (e.g., face to face only, not remotely or over
the internet), becomes a quantitative restriction" because it effectively
limits "cross-border supplies of gambling services (in this case, those
supplied over the internet from Antigua ...).,,58
The Appellate Body
noted, however, that article XVI:2(a) of GATS does not explicitly
mention a "zero quota" because "[i]f a Member wants to maintain a full
prohibition [of services], it is assumed that such a Member would not
have scheduled such a [commitment]. 59
Yet, using 1993 WTO
53 Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 2, 184, 213; see Pouncey &
Van Den Hende, supra note 52; Trachtman, supra note 30, at 862. The U.S.
could have explicitly excluded gambling and betting services from its
commitments at the time it created its committed sector schedule. See Appellate
Body Report, supra note 2, 185.
54 Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, at 67-69. The Appellate Body
used the Vienna Convention rules on treaty interpretation in making this
determination. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31:3, 32, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see Krajewski, supra note 51, at 426.
55 Panel Report, supra note 1, 5.17; see Krajewiski, supra note 51, at
428-29.

56 Panel Report, supra note 1, 7.3.
57 Appellate Body Report, supranote 2, 265.
58 Pauwelyn, supra note 5; see Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, at

86-89.

59 Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 234 (quoting Panel Report,
supra note 1, 6.331); Krajewski, supra note 51, at 433.
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Scheduling Guidelines, the Appellate Body held that the prohibition of
a service supply "amounts to a zero quota." 60 Therefore, the U.S. did
not satisfy its commitments in GATS by prohibiting the supply of
remote internet gambling services.
3. THE PUBLIC MORALS EXCEPTION
The U.S. argued to the Appellate Body that, despite a market
access violation, the Wire Act and other federal laws are justifiable
under the public morals exception. 61 The Appellate Body agreed and
determined that the U.S. measures are acceptable because they are
"necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order" under
GATS article XIV(a).62 This exception requires that a member country
satisfy a two-part test: (1) the restrictive measure must fit within the
public morals exception or be "'designed to' achieve the goal of the
must be 'necessary' for the
exception" 63 and (2) "the measure
64
protection" of culture or morals.
The WTO has applied the test's first prong subjectively by
focusing on the legislature's intent. 65 In the Antigua case, the U.S.
regulatory concerns under the public morals exception included money
laundering, organized crime, fraud, underage gambling, and public
67
health. 66 The Appellate Body "disposed of this issue very briefly,
68
and was "quick to justify" the measure as falling within the scope.
Highlighting Congress's moral-based concerns, the Appellate Body
60

Krajewski, supra note 51, at 434-35. For criticism of this approach,

see Pauwelyn, supra note 39.
61 See U.S. Appellant Submission, supra note 18, 5.
62 GATS art. XIV(a); see Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 1 293.
63 GATS art. XIV(a); Broude, supra note 46, at 684 (noting that this
prong involves a subjective test, "building principally on the declared intent of
the legislator").
64 Broude, supra note 46, at 683, 685 (suggesting that where the "actual
effect of a measure on a protected interest is difficult to measure," a WTO
panel will often find the second prong satisfied, without examining it in great
detail). For a discussion of these factors, see Appellate Body Report, supra
note 2, 7 305-06 (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef WT/DS 161/AB/R,
WT/DS I69/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000)).
65 Broude, supra note 46, at 684.
66 Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 283.
67 Broude, supra note 46, at 684.
68 Id.at 684-85 (citing Pauwelyn, supra note 5); see Appellate Body
Report, supra note 2, TT 283-84.
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found that the69Wire Act's purpose was related to the protection of
public morals.
With respect to the second prong, the U.S. argued in its
Submission to the Appellate Body that the Wire Act is a "necessary"
measure under GATS article XIV. 70 To comply with this prong, a
country must satisfy a "comparative indispensability test" known as the
"chapeau," which focuses on examining whether "viable, less trade
restrictive, substitute[]" measures exist. 71 The chapeau requires that
member countries exercise their rights under article XIV reasonably, by
applying measures "in a manner that does not constitute 'arbitrary' or
'unjustifiable' discrimination., 72
Unlike an absolute objective
effectiveness test, which concentrates "on the actual efficacy of the
challenged measure," the chapeau examines the measure at a
comparative level.73
Thus, the Appellate Body in the Antigua case examined whether
there were any less restrictive trade measures the U.S. could have
taken.74 However, the Appellate Body held that it was Antigua's duty
to raise "WTO-consistent" alternatives to a ban on remote internet
gambling. 75 Antigua in this case did not meet this burden. 76 According
to the Appellate Body, the U.S., therefore, did not need to modify its
internet gambling laws, with the exception of the IHA, because they
satisfied the public morals exception.
4. THE HORSERACING EXCEPTION AND COMPLIANCE
The Appellate Body found one exception to the U.S. general
public morals justification: the Interstate Horseracing Act.
The
Appellate Body held that the IHA potentially discriminated against
77
foreign service suppliers by prohibiting remote horseracing bets.
Therefore, the 2000 amendment to the IHA, which permits pari-mutuel
wagering, allows "domestic, but not foreign, service suppliers to offer

69
70
71
72
73

Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 299.
U.S. Appellant Submission, supra note 18, T 176.
Broude, supra note 46, at 683-85.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 339.
Broude, supra note 46, at 686.

14 Id.at 685.

75 Appellate Body Report, supra note 2,
Id. at 102-09.
" Id. 369.
76

57, 309, 320.
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remote betting services in relation to certain horse races. 78 Upholding
the Panel's findings, the Appellate Body concluded that the U.S. had
not provided "sufficiently persuasive" evidence that pari-mutuel
wagering "continues to be prohibited [under
the Wire Act]
' 79
notwithstanding the plain language of the IHA. ,
At arbitration, the WTO arbitrator held that the U.S. had until
April 3, 2006 to implement the Appellate Body's ruling by "either
prohibit[ing] all interactive interstate horseracing or allow[ing]
interstate interactive horseracing access to GATS members." 80 But, the
U.S. failed to modify the legal status of online interstate horseracing,
arguing that the Wire Act already rendered online wagering on
horseracing illegal. 81 Despite the U.S. position, a WTO compliance
panel ruled that the U.S. "failed to take any measures to bring
its
82
restrictions on online gambling in line with the WTO's findings."
TWO LIKELY PATHS AVAILABLE TO THE U.S. FOLLOWING
THE APPELLATE BODY DECISION

Subject to the Compliance Panel. If Panel finds
continued lack of compliance, the U.S. could face
economic sanctions

Antigua Dispute ends. U.S. not subject t
Compliance Panel
C
e

78 Pauwelyn, supra note 5. For a discussion of the IHA amendment, see
supra Part I.B.
79 Appellate Body Report, supra note 2,
80 Arbitration Report, supra note 6,

364.
68; Interview, Clash in the

Caribbean: Antigua and U.S. Dispute Internet Gambling and GATS: An
Interview with Joseph M. Kelly, 10 UNLV GAMING RES. & REv. J. 15, 15-16
(2006) [hereinafter Clash in the Caribbean].
81 See supra Part I.B; Daniel Pruzin, WTO Panel Rules U.S. Failed to
Comply with Gambling Ruling, INT'L TRADE R., Jan. 26, 2007 [hereinafter
Pruzin, WTO Panel].
82 Pruzin, WTO Panel,supra note 81.
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C. THE 2007 COMPLIANCE REPORT
The Compliance Panel found in 2007 that the U.S. had failed to
comply with the Appellate Body Report in the Antigua case.83 The
Panel reaffirmed the original Panel's finding in the Antigua dispute,
noting that "there is ambiguity as to the relationship between, on the
84
one hand, the amendment to the IHA and, on the other, the Wire Act."
The ruling did not examine the UIGEA and whether it satisfies
GATS.85 The Panel observed that (1) the U.S. "had an opportunity to
remove the ambiguity and thereby comply" with the Appellate Body
Report and (2) instead of taking this opportunity, the U.S. "enacted
legislation that confirmed that the ambiguity" in the Antigua case
remains and therefore has failed to comply. 86 The Compliance Panel,
therefore, did not rule on whether the UIGEA would satisfy GATS, in
particular, article XIV.
In response to the Compliance Panel decision, the U.S. attempted
on May 4, 2007 to modify its gambling services commitments under
GATS. 87 To avoid complying with the Appellate Body Report, the
U.S. evaded the WTO decision altogether. 88 As a result of the U.S.
attempt to alter its commitments, Antigua filed a request for arbitration

83

Compliance Report, supra note 7, 7.1.

84 Id.

6.134 (citing Panel Report, supra note 1,

6.599); see also

supra note 80 (upholding the Panel Report's finding that the U.S. had not
proven that the Wire Act trumped the 2000 IHA amendment).
85 See Compliance Report, supra note 7, 6.35, 6.130.
86

Id. 6.135.

87

Daniel Pruzin, Antigua to Seek WTO OK for $3.4 Billion in

Sanctions on U.S. Imports in Gaming Case, INT'L TRADE R., June 21, 2007.
88 See Gary G. Yerkey, Reps. Frank, Conyers Call on Administration to
Settle Gambling Dispute with Legislation, INT'L TRADE R., Nov. 22, 2007
(commenting on Rep. Frank and Conyers' concern with the "relatively
unprecedented" U.S. approach and "interest in considering possible legislative
solutions [such as the Internet Gambling Regulation and Enforcement Act of
2007, H.R. 2046, 110th Cong. (2007)] that might restore U.S. compliance with
the GATS agreement") (quoting Frank and Conyers' November 19 letter to
U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. Schwab). For further discussion of H.R.
2046, see Amy Tsui, Bill Legalizing Internet Gambling Could Be Solution to
WTO Problem, Panelist Says, INT'L TRADE R., Nov. 15, 2007. In line with
Rep. Frank and Conyers' concerns, this Note considers the route the U.S.
should take to avoid additional compensation claims and renegotiating its
GATS commitments.
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in January 2008 to reach a compensation deal, 89 and continue[d] to
affirm that "[t]here is no negotiating history suggesting that the United
States intended 90to make a commitment in this [gambling and betting

services] area."

IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S. LAW: THE UNLAWFUL
INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2006
Although the U.S. failed to take any measures to comply with the
Appellate Body Report, it took steps to further prohibit cross-border
internet gambling by enacting the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA). 9 1 The UIGEA clarifies the status
of remote internet gambling under existing U.S. laws and requires
financial institutions to identify and block illegal internet gambling
92
transactions.
A. STATUTORYLANGUAGE: KEY PROVISIONS OF THE UIGEA
1. THE UIGEA'S PURPOSE
The UIGEA begins by addressing Congressional Findings and its
Purpose under § 5361, which are relevant in determining whether the
89 Daniel Pruzin, Intellectual Property Group Argues IP Retaliation
Feasible in WTO Disputes Against U.S. Measures, INT'L TRADE R., May 22,
2008. A WTO arbitration panel on December 21, 2007 also gave Antigua the
right to impose trade sanctions against the U.S. and suspend intellectual
property rights protections against U.S. patent holders. Id.
90 Pruzin, supra note 87. In addition, at the time of this Note, the U.S.
settled compensation claims with the E.U. and Costa Rica, but is currently
negotiating compensation claims with India, Macao, and of course, Antigua.
Associated Press, EU and US Make Deal in WTO Internet Gambling Dispute,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 17, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/12/17/
technology/gamble.php; Daniel Pruzin, Costa Rica Drops Gambling
Arbitration Claim, INT'L TRADE R., Mar. 6, 2008.
9" The UIGEA, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-67, was added to the Port Security
Bill, H.R. 4954, and signed into law by the President on October 13, 2006. See
William Branigin, Bush Signs Bill to EnhancePort Security, WASH. POST, Oct.
13, 2006. The UIGEA was based in part on prior intemet gambling bills, as
will be discussed later in this article.
92 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-67; I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: The
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 Analyzed (2006),
http://www.gamblingandthelaw.com/columns/2006_act.htm [hereinafter Rose,
UIGEA].
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UIGEA seeks to address public morals.93 The Act relies on the
National Gambling Impact Study Commission['s] (NGISC)
recommendations in 1999,94 which called for wire transfers to internet
gambling sites to be blocked. 95 The NGISC studied gambling's "social
and economic impacts" and suggested that Congress prohibit internet
gambling due to "the difficulty of policing and regulating96 [internet
gambling] to prevent such things as participation by minors."
Furthermore, § 5361 refers to the following purposes behind the
UIGEA: (1) debt collection problems for financial institutions and (2)
inadequate law enforcement mechanisms to regulate internet
gambling. 97 Importantly, this section of UIGEA does not "alter, limit,
or extend" any federal, state, or tribal law. 98 Therefore, the UIGEA
changes neither the scope of the Wire Act nor the Interstate
Horseracing Act.
2. DEFINING KEY TERMS WITHIN THE INTERNET GAMBLING
CONTEXT
Section, 5362, provides a list of definitions, including "unlawful
internet gambling." These definitions clarify the status of unlawful
internet gambling. The UIGEA defines a "bet or wager" as:
staking or risking by any person of
something of value upon the
outcome of a contest of others, a
sporting event, or a game subject to
chance, upon an agreement or
understanding that the person or
93 See supra Part 1II.B.3.

94 The National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act created the

NGISC, whose duty was "to conduct a comprehensive legal and factual study
of the social and economic impacts of gambling in the United States." National
Gambling Impact Study Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 104-169, § 4, 110 Stat.
1482 (1996). Congress required the NGISC to assess the effects of intemet
gambling, "the relationship between gambling and levels of crime," and
gambling's impact on families. Id.
"
96

31 U.S.C. § 5361(a)(2).

Pub. L. No. 104-169, 110 Stat. 1482 (1996); National Gambling
Impact Study Commission, June 19, 1999, at 5-12 ("NGISC"). Protecting
minors is a key public morals concern.
17 31 U.S.C. § 5361(a)(3)-(4).

" 31 U.S.C. § 5361(a).
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another
person
will
receive
something of value in the event of a
certain outcome. 99
This definition encompasses contests, "sporting event[s]," and
lotteries on sporting events;' 00 thus, the UIGEA's definition of "bet or
wager" is in line with the Fifth Circuit's understanding in In re
MasterCard 01' "Bet or wager" also "includes any instruction
or
10 2
information" regarding the transfer of funds by the bettor.
The UIGEA also defines a "Financial Transaction Provider" as a
credit card company or banking institution that permits electronic
transfers or transactions.' 0 3 Finally, § 5362 notes that "unlawful
Internet gambling means to place, receive, or otherwise knowingly
transmit a bet or wager by any means" involving the internet, where the
bet or wager is illegal under federal, state, or tribal law.10 4 Therefore,
the UIGEA "covers internet gambling that was already illegal" under
preexisting laws. 10 5 The definitions within § 5362 simply clarify the
legal status of internet gambling. For example, the UIGEA excludes
bets or wagers permissible under the Interstate Horseracing Act,
thereby not changing the legality of horseracing activities.'0 6 The
UIGEA also defines internet gambling within the same scope as the
Wire Act, by looking to where a bet was "made or received" and not to
intermediary computers. '07

9' 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(A).

'00 31 U.S.C. § 5362(l)(A)-(B).
101See supra Part lI.B.
102 31 U.S.C. § 5362 (1)(D); see Rose, UIGEA, supra note 92.
103 31 U.S.C. § 5362(4). The UIGEA states that a financial transaction
provider is "a creditor, credit card issuer, financial institution, [or] operator of a
terminal" allowing "electronic fund transfer[s]" or "credit transaction[s]." Id.
'0431 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(C).
105 Pouncey & Van Den Hende, supra note 52.
'06 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(D)(i); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(D)(iii)
(noting that "[i]t is the sense of Congress that this subchapter shall not change
which activities related to horse racing may or may not be allowed under
Federal law).
107See Rose, UIGEA, supra note 92. Additionally, bets or wagers made
and received within a single state do not fall under the definition of "unlawful
internet gambling." 31 U.S.C. § 5362(l0)(B).
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3. THE HEART OF THE UIGEA: BLOCKING INTERNET
GAMBLING TRANSACTIONS
In section 5363, the UIGEA prohibits acceptance of any financial
instrument for unlawful internet gambling.108 In addition, federal
regulators had until mid-July 2007 to develop regulations "to identify
and block" restricted transactions to internet gambling websites. 0 9
One question this section leaves open is whether those financial
institutions not subject to the U.S. regulations will follow this
measure.110 Thus far, this provision of the UIGEA has caused many
remote internet gambling operations to shut down services to U.S.
customers. 11
4. SECTION 803 OF THE UIGEA AND MORAL-BASED
CONCERNS
The UIGEA's final section, section 803, requests but does not
require the U.S. Government to "encourage cooperation by foreign
governments" in determining whether internet gambling is being used
for "money laundering, corruption, or other crimes." 112 The section
calls upon the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering to
prepare a report each year detailing their study of "the extent to which
Internet gambling operations are being used for money laundering
purposes." ' 13 Section 803 is important in that it is the only section of
the Act that references moral-based concerns such as "money
laundering" and suggests that such crimes might have been a rationale
behind the UIGEA.

'0' 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (stating that "[n]o person engaged in the business
of betting or wagering may knowingly accept" monetary transactions from
another person involved in "unlawful Internet gambling").
109 31 U.S.C. § 5364.

110 See Rose, UIGEA, supra note 92.
..
' See infra Part IV.C.
112 Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-347, 120 Stat. 1952, 1962 (2006).
113Id.
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B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORYAND PRIOR INTERNET GAMBLING
BILLS
The committee reports dealing with the UIGEA contain no14
references to WTO commitments or the Appellate Body Report."
Congress seemed oblivious to the WTO Appellate Body Report when
drafting the UIGEA. Instead, Rep. James A. Leach (R-IA) asserted that
the UIGEA is designed to support the "integrity" of sports games, as
well as "the unity of the American family."'1 5 Sponsors of the bill
specifically noted that transactions complying
with the IHA are not
16
within unlawful internet gambling's scope.'
The UIGEA is based in part on a number of previous,
unsuccessful internet gambling bills, in particular Rep. Leach and Rep.
Goodlatte's (R-VA) bills." 7 Unlike these prior bills, however, the
UIGEA's purpose is not to update the Wire Act." 8 Instead, the UIGEA
serves as a supplement to clarify the legal status of unlawful internet
gambling and block transactions to gambling sites. Furthermore, the
114 See id.
"1 152 CONG. REc. H4984 (2006).

116 Tom LaMarra, Horse Racing Safe as Internet Gambling Ban Passes,
July 14, 2006, http://news.bloodhorse.com/article/34360.htm
117 Rep. Jim Leach (R-IA) introduced H.R. 4411, known as the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act in 2005. The bill focused on
blocking payments used to fund unlawful internet gambling sites. House
Approves Goodlatte Legislation to Combat Illegal Gambling, Current News
Releases, July 11, 2006, http://www.house.gov/list/press/va06_goodlatte/
061106.html. While H.R. 4411 prohibited all forms of intemet gambling, not
just sports betting, it did carve an exception for horseracing. Legislative
Bulletin on HR. 4411, Republican Study Committee (2006), available at
http://www.house.gov/pence/ rsc. H.R. 4411 also included a title on the
"Modernization of the Wire Act," which expanded the definition of
"communication facility" to include interet technologies. H.R. 4411, 109th
Cong. (2006). Like H.R. 4411, Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) introduced the
Internet Gambling Prohibition Act (H.R. 4777) in 2006. The bill's main
purpose was to update the Wire Act by applying it to intemet gambling. Joseph
J. McBurney, Note & Comment, To Regulate or To Prohibit:An Analysis of
the Internet Gambling Industry and the Needfor a Decision on the Industry's
Future in the United States, 21 CONN. J. INT'L L. 337, 363 (2006); see Karen L.
Werner, Internet Gambling Provisions Pass Congress Barring Use of Credit
Cards in Transactions, INT'L TRADE R., Oct. 3, 2006 (noting that despite the
UIGEA, Rep. Goodlatte is preparing a new initiative to update the federal Wire
Act). At the time it was introduced, H.R. 4777 did not address the legal status
of online wagering on horseracing. H.R. 4777, 109th Cong. (2006).
118 See Rose, UIGEA, supra note 92, at 1.
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UIGEA "incorporates an agreement between the Justice Department
and the horseracing industry," by creating an exception for wagering on
horseracing." 9 Thus, the UIGEA is distinguishable from prior internet
gambling bills, in part because its aim is not to modernize the Wire Act.
C. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE UIGEA

In response to Congress's enactment of the UIGEA, a number of
WTO member countries have suggested that the UIGEA, which was
"rushed through Congress," represents U.S. indifference toward WTO
law. 120 Antigua claims the new law "flies in the face of the [2005]
WTO ruling."' 121 While some internet gambling sites in Caribbean
countries, such as BoDog and PokerStars, plan to continue reaching
U.S. customers, operations in other countries, such as the United
Kingdom,122have closed off their businesses to the U.S. as result of the
UIGEA.
The United Kingdom's internet gambling industry has
experienced the greatest effects of the UIGEA's enactment. For
example, London-based PartyGaming's stock price crashed 57% after
123
Congress enacted the UIGEA, which accounted for 7 billion USD.
Similarly, London-based BetOnSports stopped accepting wagers from
U.S. customers 124 and entered a settlement in the U.S. in early
November, requiring it to refund wagers from U.S. customers.' 25 U.S.
prosecutors also arrested two founders of one of the largest internet
119 Werner, supra note 117.
120 See, e.g., Ryan Nakashima, Gamblers Take Aim at InternetBan, USA
TODAY, Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-11-16-netgambling-change x.htm; Tony Batt, Net Betting Ban Violates WTO Ruling,
Lawyer Says, REVIEWJOURNAL.COM, Oct. 5, 2006, http://www.review

journal.comlvrjhome/2006/Oct-05-Thu-2006/business/I 0050242.html.
121 Batt, supra note 120.

122 See Andy Sullivan, New Law Won't Stop Internet Gambling, PC
WORLD, Nov. 21, 2006, http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,127928-page, l/
article.html.
123Id.; Parmy Olson, Online Bets Are Off, FORBES.COM, Oct. 2, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/business/2006/10/02/intemet-gambling-offshore-tech-

ebiz-cxjpo_1002gambling.html (noting that another UK gambling site's, 888
Holding, stock value fell dramatically).
124 Anne Broache, U.S. Permanently Bans BetOnSports, CNET
NEWS.coM, Nov. 10, 2006, http://news.com.com/U.S.+permanently+bans+
BetOnSports/2100-1030 3-6134433.html.
125Id.
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gambling companies, British payment processor NETeller.126 As a
result of the arrests, NETeller was forced to close down its U.S. internet
gambling services, which "wipe[d] out over 65 percent of its
business."' 127 The U.K. does not plan on2 prohibiting remote internet
gambling, but will continue to regulate it.'

1

V. A WTO PANEL WILL MOST LIKELY FIND THAT THE
UIGEA IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH WTO LAW
A. A WTO PanelShould Rule that the UIGEA Does Not Comply with
GA TS
A WTO panel would likely format its decision using the structure
of the Appellate Body Report in the Antigua case: (1) Commitments;
(2) Prohibited Market Access Restrictions; (3) Public Morals
Exception; and (4) the Horseracing Exception.129
1. U.S. COMMITMENTS
First, based on the same analysis in the Appellate Body ruling, a
WTO panel would find that the U.S. established commitments to
supply market access and non-discriminatory treatment in gambling
and betting services under GATS.1 30 As the Appellate Body held,
sporting services do not include gambling or betting.' 3 1 Rather,
gambling and betting32 fall under the committed sector of "other
recreational services."'

Pete Harrison, U.S. NETeller Arrests Deal Blow to Net Gambling,
REUTERS, Jan. 18, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/intemetNews/idUSL
181000020070118?sp-true.
127 id.
126

Id.
129 See supra Part II.B.
130 See id
Although the U.S. has attempted to withdraw its
128

commitments, its decision circumvents the Appellate Body Report, and
undercuts the legitimacy of the WTO dispute process. See supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
131 Id.
132 Appellate Body Report, supra note 2,

201.
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2. PROHIBITED MARKET ACCESS RESTRICTION

The UIGEA's .internet gambling prohibition violates U.S.
commitments under the WTO. Thus, the UIGEA falls within the
prohibited "market access restriction" category because it bans remote
suppliers from providing gambling services. 33 The UIGEA defines
"unlawful internet gambling" as betting, receiving, or transmitting bets
that are already illegal under existing federal, state, or tribal law, such
as the Wire Act.134 A WTO panel would therefore follow a similar
analysis to that of the Appellate Body Report in making a market
access restriction determination, because the UIGEA does not amend
the Wire Act or other federal laws. 135 A panel would almost assuredly
find a violation here, because the effect of the UIGEA's ban on remote
internet gambling is even more apparent than in the Antigua case. For
example, as a result of the UIGEA's passage the effects on the United
Kingdom's internet gambling industry have been substantial, causing a
number of internet 36gaming sites and payment processors to shut down
service in the U.S.'
3. THE PUBLIC MORALS EXCEPTION: A TWO-PRONGED
ANALYSIS
The public morals exception presents the most substantial
issue for a WTO panel.
Although the UIGEA violates U.S.
commitments under the WTO, the U.S. would try to justify the UIGEA
under the public morals exception, as it did in the Antigua case.' 37 The
U.S. would make similar arguments to those it made in the Antigua
38
case because the UIGEA does not alter the scope of the Wire Act;'
thus, many of the same U.S. contentions would apply.' 39 Furthermore,
given the success of the U.S. public morals exception argument before
133 See Appellate Body Report, supra note 2,
252, 265; see also
Pauwelyn, supra note 5.
14 31 U.S.C. § 5362; see Rose, UIGEA, supra note 92, at 1.
135 See supra Part IV.A. 1-2.
136 See supra Part IV.C.
137 The United States argued in its brief to the WTO Appellate Body that
the Wire Act was justified under the public morals exception. See U.S.
Appellant Submission, supra note 18, 5.
138 See supra Part IV.A.1-2.
139 As in the Antigua case, the U.S. would argue that (1) the UIGEA fits
within the scope of the public morals exception, and (2) the Wire Act is a
"necessary" measure under GATS article X1V. See supra Part II.B.3.
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the Appellate Body, the U.S. would likely assert that exception to the
UIGEA. 140 However, the U.S. will have a harder time arguing that the
public morals exception should apply to the UIGEA, as compared to its
argument concerning the Wire Act in the Antigua case. 141
a. THE FIRST PRONG: THE SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC MORALS
EXCEPTION
In applying the two-part public morals exception test, a WTO
panel must first ask: does the UIGEA fall within the scope of the public
morals exception?1 42 Because the WTO tends to interpret this first step
broadly, 43 the UIGEA will likely fall within the scope of the public
morals exception. Satisfying this factor, however, will not be a simple
task for the U.S. The U.S. would need to emphasize the UIGEA's
intent, rationale, and legislative history to argue successfully that the
Act's main purpose is to protect the U.S. from fraud, money
laundering, and underage gambling.
A WTO panel would address two main questions regarding this
prong. First, does the UIGEA's measures suggest a moral or cultural
rationale? The U.S. would emphasize, as it argued in its brief to the
Appellate Body, that the UIGEA is not a "disguised restriction on trade
in services."' 44 Moreover, the DOJ would contend that the UIGEA has
"nothing to do with protectionism" and is "applied to protect society
from the continuing threats to . . . public morals.' 145 Despite these
arguments, a WTO panel would have to balance whether the measure is
more economic than morals-based, and whether the government's main
purpose is to "eliminate an untaxed competitor". 146 It will be more
difficult for the U.S. to satisfy with respect to the UIGEA, as opposed
to the Wire Act in the Antigua case. Congress enacted the latter "long
before Internet gambling was even thought possible" and thus for
reasons unrelated to the "protection" of the domestic internet gambling

140 See supra Part III.B.3.
141 See supra Part I1.
142 See supra Part III.B.3.
143 See Broude, supra note 46, at 684.
144 U.S. Appellant Submission, supra note 18,

204.

145id.
146 SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 8; see Dana Gale, The Economic

Incentive Behind the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, (Benjamin
N. Cardozo Sch. of Law Working Paper, 2006), at 16-17, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-942689.
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industry 147 and enacted the former when internet gambling was at its
peak. It is more likely, therefore, that the UIGEA was based, at least in
part, on protectionism.
Second, does the UIGEA's legislative history suggest a moral or
cultural rationale? The congressional record on the UIGEA mentions
little in the way of fraud, money laundering, or other similar purposes.
Instead, the record comments vaguely on the "devastating losses of
internet gambling" and expresses concern for the "unity of the
American family." 148 Furthermore, section 5361 references only debt
collection problems and the
difficulty of enforcing internet gambling
149
laws as the Act's purposes.
Yet, references to money laundering and other public morals
concerns in the UIGEA and its session law form indicate that Congress
had a moral rationale. For example, section 803 encourages foreign
governments to cooperate in identifying where internet gambling 15is
0
being used for "money laundering, corruption, or other crimes."
Section 803 also promotes the establishment of a task force to examine
the extent to which internet gambling is used for money laundering
purposes. 151
Finally, the National Gambling Impact Study
Commission's report, cited in section 5361 of the UIGEA, also
highlights moral-based concerns, such as protecting minors.1 52 These
references suggest that Congress expressed concern about money
laundering and other crimes when drafting the UIGEA.
Emphasizing section 803's explicit concern regarding public
morals, the WTO will likely conclude that the UIGEA's measures are
moral-based. A WTO panel would not find that Congress enacted the
UIGEA for solely economic purposes. 53 Thus, despite the absence of
an explicit moral rationale in the UIGEA's legislative history, the WTO
will likely interpret this first prong broadly, as it did in the Appellate
Body Report.

147 See U.S. Appellant Submission, supra note 18, 204.
148 152 CONG. REC. H8029 (2006) (statement of Rep. Leach).
14' 31 U.S.C. § 5361(a)(3)-(4)(2006).
150 Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347,
120 Stat. 1952, 1962 (2006).
151 id.
152 NGISC, supra note 96, at 5-12.
153 Section 803 of Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1952, and its reference
to the NGISC suggest that Congress's rationale was at least partially moralbased.

100

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF

[Vol. 5:75

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS
b. THE SECOND PRONG: THE NECESSITY TEST

Under the public morals exception, a WTO panel would examine
whether the UIGEA is "necessary" to protect American culture and
morals. 154 The U.S. will have more difficulty proving that the UIGEA
is "necessary" than demonstrating that it falls within the public morals
exception. 155 A panel would apply the comparative indispensability
test, inquiring whether there are less trade-restrictive alternatives, also
known as "WTO-consistent alternative measures.', 156 In the case of the
UIGEA, there is a WTO-consistent alternative: if the U.S. prohibited all
forms of remote internet gambling, including pari-mutuel wagering on
horseracing, it would still meet its public morals goals, while at the
same time not discriminating against foreign service suppliers.
While Antigua failed to meet its burden to raise less traderestrictive alternatives, other member countries that raise complaints
against the U.S. regarding internet gambling will have learned the
importance of raising alternative means.
4. HORSERACING EXCEPTION
Finally, by explicitly excluding the IHA from its scope, the
UIGEA allows an exception for pari-mutuel horseracing. 158 As noted
in the Appellate Body Report, this exception discriminates against
foreign suppliers of remote internet gambling services. 59 Therefore,
even if the public morals exception is applied to the UIGEA, it
nevertheless discriminates against remote service suppliers of parimutuel horseracing.

114 GATS art. XIV(a).
155 Broude, supra note 46, at 684.
156

See Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, § 305-06 (citing Appellate

Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and

Frozen Beef WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R(Dec. 11, 2000)); Broude,
supra note 46, at 683-85.
157 See Thayer, supra note 29, at 17.
158

See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(b)(iii)(I).

159 See supra Part III.B.4.
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VI. PROPOSED MEASURES THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE TO
COMPLY WITH GATS AND WHY COMPLIANCE IS
NECESSARY
A. PROPOSED MEASURES
To comply with GATS, the U.S. should first clarify that the
UIGEA applies to betting on horseracing, as well as amend the IHA to
prohibit internet gambling on pari-mutuel wagering. Second, the U.S.
should adjust the UIGEA to fit within the GATS public morals
exception. The following suggestions are the most practical measures
for the U.S. to take because they involve little change to existing U.S
law, yet are significant enough to prevent further internet gambling
complaints from member countries.1 6 Amending the UIGEA would
put the U.S. in a better position should future WTO complaints against
the U.S. arise. Modifying existing U.S. law is necessary
because it is
16
difficult to amend the list of GATS commitments.'
1. THE U.S. SHOULD MODIFY THE IHA AND UIGEA TO APPLY
TO ONLINE WAGERING ON HORSERAC1NG
First, the U.S. should amend the IHA and clarify that the UIGEA
applies to betting on horseracing.' 62 Currently, the IHA discriminates
against foreign service suppliers: it permits "domestic, but not foreign,
services suppliers to offer remote betting service in relation to certain
horse races."' 163 Despite the DOJ's position that all types of remote
internet gambling are illegal under existing federal law, the U.S. should
follow the Appellate Body's interpretation and modify the IHA and

160 Note that the measures outlined below overlap at times.

161 I. Nelson Rose, U.S. Ignores Deadline in WTO Fight with Antigua,
10 GAMING L. REv. 225, 228 (2006) [hereinafter Rose, U.S. Ignores Deadline]
("[T]o add gambling to the excluded list, the United States would have to give
up" another committed sector, which is extremely unlikely.). Nevertheless, on
May 4, 2007, the U.S. took an unprecedented move by choosing to evade the
WTO compliance decision and altering its GATS market access schedules. As
a result, the U.S. must offer significant compensation to Antigua as well as
other affected countries, such as the E.U. See Yerkey, supra note 89. At the
time of this article, compensation agreements are still in progress.
162 This is the most realistic solution for the U.S., given that it is unlikely
Congress will expand the scope of legal gambling. Id. at 227.
163 Pauwelyn, supra note 5.
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UIGEA. 64 The DOJ's position conflicts with (1) the Fifth Circuit's
holding in In re MasterCard;165 (2) general principles of statutory
67
construction;166 and (3) the exceptions carved out in the UIGEA.1
2. THE U.S. SHOULD MODIFY THE UIGEA TO ENSURE THAT
IT FALLS WITHIN THE PUBLIC MORALS EXCEPTION
Second, the U.S. should adjust the UIGEA to fit within the public
morals exception. Although a WTO panel would likely find that the
UIGEA satisfies the first prong of the public morals test, the scope of
public morals exception, the U.S. should nevertheless amend the statute
to clarify that the purpose of the UIGEA is not only to target debt
collection and to improve law enforcement, but also to prevent fraud,
money laundering, and underage gambling. 168 With respect to the
second prong of the public morals test, the necessity requirement, the
U.S. should amend the UIGEA to ban all forms of remote internet
gambling. Prohibiting all offshore internet gambling is a more "WTOconsistent alternative measure" that the U.S. should take, given the
likelihood that future complaints against the U.S. would focus on this
second prong. 169 Thus, the best way for the U.S. to prohibit 17
all
forms
0
of remote internet gambling is to apply the ban to horseracing.

164See Albena P. Petrova, The WTO Internet Gambling Dispute as a
Case of First Impression: How to Interpret Exceptions under GATS Article
XIV(A) and How to Set the Trendfor Implementation and Compliance in WTO
Cases Involving "Public Morals" and "Public Order" Concerns?, 6 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & Bus. 45 (2006)(finding that the U.S. should amend the IHA).
165 See supra Part II.B.
166 See supra Part II.B.
167 See supra Part IV.A.2.
168 See supra Part V.B.3.
169 See Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 311.

In addition, the UIGEA does not prohibit states from discriminating
against remote internet gambling suppliers. The Wire Act's safe harbor
provision permits states to discriminate in this manner if they so choose.
Thayer, supra note 29, at 14. While this Article does not attempt to address
state internet gambling laws, it is important to note that this issue might arise in
future WTO claims as a market access violation.
170
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B. THE U.S. SHOULD COMPLY WITH THE WTO TO A VOID
FUTURE COMPLAINTS AND RETALIATION FROM MEMBER
COUNTRIES, AND TO SUPPORT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE WTO
The U.S. should comply with GATS and the Appellate Body's
decision in the Antigua case for three reasons. First, compliance would
help avoid future complaints from larger WTO member countries or the
European Union."' For example, the European Union has already
72
considered raising a prospective WTO claim regarding the new law.
Future complaints will most likely focus on whether the new UIGEA
excludes pari-mutuel betting on horseracing and meets both prongs of
the public morals exception.
Second, complying with GATS is important to avoid patent
retaliation from member countries. Under WTO law, if the U.S.
ignores a WTO finding or decision, member countries will have the
option to disregard treaties requiring them to comply with U.S. patent
laws. 73
For example, because the U.S. refused to follow the
Compliance Panel's findings in the Antigua case, WTO arbitration
panel gave Antigua the right to disregard U.S. copyrights on (e.g.,)
videos, music, electronics, or software. 174 This type of retaliation will
pose serious ramifications for the U.S. if larger WTO member countries
bring internet gambling complaints. Moreover, member countries

171 Pouncey & Van Den Hende, supra note 52.
172 Tobias Buck, EU Calls US Betting Law

'Protectionist', FIN.

TIMES.COM, Jan. 30, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/4c93a6fa-b091-11 db-8a620000779e2340.html (noting, however, that "it is not clear whether the Union
will follow through" on this threat).
173 Henry Lanman, Rolling the Dice: The United States' Big Legal
Gamble with Internet Gaming, SLATE, Nov. 15, 2006. Under WTO law, states
are permitted to retaliate by imposing trade sanctions, such as suspending their
compliance with (e.g.) U.S. intellectual property laws. Id.; Understanding the
WTO: Settling Disputes, supra note 1; see also Tuan N. Samahon, TRIPS
Copyright Dispute Settlement After the Transition and Moratorium:
Nonviolation andSituation ComplaintsAgainst Developing Countries, 31 INT'L
Bu. 1051, 1071-72 (2000) (noting that while retaliation is an available remedy
under the WTO, it is "generally disfavored" as a first resort).
174 James Kanter & Gary Rivlin, Ruling Lets Antigua Be Pirate to
Punish U.S. in Trade Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2007, at C3; Pruzin,
Intellectual Property, supra note 89; see Lanman, supra note 172174; Radley

Balko, You Go, Antigua, THEAGITATOR.COM, Oct. 19, 2006, http://www.the

agitator.com /archives/027144.php.
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might also retaliate by refusing to allow U.S. companies to use certain
geographical indications. 175
Third, the U.S. has "interests in supporting the legitimacy of the
WTO."' 176 Continuing to ignore its commitments under the WTO with
respect to the new law will cost the U.S. "significant trade capital" and
lead to trade sanctions or concessions. 177 If the U.S. ignores its WTO
obligations, then178other countries might ignore their WTO obligations
toward the U.S.
C. CRITICISM
There are three main counterarguments in response to this
proposal that focus on the public morals exception. First, critics might
argue that a WTO panel should hold that the U.S. has not met the first
prong of the public morals exception, and find that the U.S. intent
behind the UIGEA is economic-based. Second, existing U.S. federal
laws are the most WTO-consistent measures available. Third, the U.S.
should not prohibit online wagering on horseracing.
1. THE U.S. HAS NOT MET THE FIRST PRONG OF THE PUBLIC
MORALS EXCEPTION
First, because the UIGEA presents no clear moral or cultural
rationale in either its text or legislative history, a WTO panel might find
that the public morals exception cannot encompass the UIGEA.
Proponents of this view argue that the purpose behind the UIGEA is
almost entirely "economic in nature."' 7 9 The problem with this
argument, however, is that the UIGEA's reference to money laundering
and corruption in section 803 suggests that there are moral-based
purposes behind the statute. 18° Moreover, because the WTO tends to

175 I am indebted to Carolyn Bleck, J.D., 2008, The George Washington
University Law School for this idea. For a general discussion of the current
debate on geographical indications, see Broude, supra note 46, at 625-34. For
an example of retaliation under the WTO, see Ecuador Retaliation,
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2001/geomvd/pdf/geomvd 2.pdf
176 Thayer, supra note 29, at 18.
177 id.

178 Clash in the Caribbean,supra note 80, at 18.

179 See Gale, supra note 146, at 3.
180 See supra Part 1V.A.4.
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loosely interpret the public morals exception's scope,18 section 803's
reference to morals will be enough to satisfy this prong. '
2. EXISTING FEDERAL LAWS ARE WTO-CONSISTENT
Second, another area of contention centers on whether the U.S.
could use any less trade-restrictive alternatives.' 8 2 In line with the
DOJ's position, critics argue that prohibiting all types of intemet
gambling is not a less trade-restrictive alternative, because the Wire Act
already prohibits all forms of internet gambling. This reasoning,
the Appellate Body Report as well as the In re
however, conflicts with
183
MasterCarddecision.

3. THE U.S. SHOULD NOT PROHIBIT INTERNET WAGERING
ON HORSERACING
Lastly, the U.S. should not prohibit pari-mutuel wagering on
horseracing. 184 Proponents of the horseracing industry have argued that
horseracing is a major industry in the United States, whose "fastest
growing segment" is the pari-mutuel business. 185 Carving out an
exception for the IHA, however, discriminates against foreign internet
181See supra Part V.A.3. In addition, based on the legislative history of
Rep. Goodlatte's past internet gambling bills, which served as a basis for the
UIGEA, it is unlikely that the UIGEA's sole purpose is economic. See Posting
of Simon Lester to International Economic Law and Policy Blog,
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2006/1 1/why did the us .html
(Nov. 10, 2006, 17:58 EST). Rep. Goodlatte's bills focused specifically on
"protecting children" and on corruption. CONG. REC. E191 (daily ed. Feb. 16,
2006) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte); see also House Approves Goodlatte
Legislation to Combat Illegal Gambling, Current News Release, July 11 2006
(noting that H.R. 4411 will help combat interstate internet gambling, which
"serve[s] as a vehicle for money laundering" and "undermine[s] families").
While this Note agrees that the UIGEA would benefit from a revised
"Congressional Findings and Purpose" under § 5361, it does not call for a
substantial overhaul at this point.
182 The WTO also referred to "less trade-restrictive alternative[s]" as
"WTO-consistent trade alternatives" or "WTO-consistent alternatives." See
Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 308.
183 See supra Part II.B.
184 See Cabot & Christiansen, supra note 28, at 201, 203-04.
185 Id. at 201-02; see Matt Hegarty, Congress Passes Internet Gambling
Bill, DAILY RACING FoRM,

Oct.

2, 2006,

aspx?type=fedleg&style-red&id=20470.

http://www.ntra.com/content.
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service providers. If the U.S. does not wish to outlaw online betting on
horseracing, its only other option is to allow "foreign racebooks to take
[horseracing] bets" from the U.S., which would have "virtually no
[negative] impact" on the current status of internet gambling. 8 6 Yet,
Congress is not likely to pass a law expanding the scope of legal
intemet gambling. 187 Thus, the most realistic option for the U.S. is to
include pari-mutuel wagering on horses within the overall reach of the
UIGEA.

VII. CONCLUSION
The UIGEA violates GATS, in particular as examined against the
backdrop of the Appellate Body Report. To comply with GATS, the
U.S. should modify the law to include interstate gambling on
horseracing and to satisfy the public morals exception. Instead of
evading its WTO commitments altogether, the U.S. should amend the
UIGEA as soon as possible to avoid future WTO complaints from
larger member countries or the European Union.

186

Rose, US. Ignores Deadline, supra note 161, at 227.

187 Id.

